THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

“CYBERANARCHY” IN THE DIGITAL AGE: DEVELOPING A SYSTEM OF HUMAN
(COPY)RIGHTS
MICHAEL L. BOYLE
ABSTRACT
“Cyberanarchy,” broadly refers to the idea that legal regulation of the Internet is an infeasible
objective. One prime example is current online enforcement mechanisms’ inability to quell copyright
infringement. These mechanisms do little more than perpetuate a technological arms race between
copyright holders and infringers. Moreover, with notable public relations failures, such as the RIAA
lawsuits and digital rights management schemes, society has taken on a nonchalant attitude
towards online infringement. Examining traditional justifications behind obedience to the law, this
blasé attitude takes root in societal feelings of inadequacy both in “normative” and “instrumental”
perspectives of justice. Normatively, there lacks a cohesive societal idea of justice and obligation.
Instrumentally, there lacks proper infrastructure and administrative ability to enforce online
copyright laws. This leads to unfettered digital copyright infringement. Focusing on copyrights as
human rights strikes a balance between instrumental and normative considerations of copyright
enforcement. Ostensibly, this would obligate lawmakers to bring end-users into the legislative
discussion, while furthering the creation of a legal framework that resonates with societal
perspectives of justice. When these perspectives serve as the cornerstone to the existing legal
framework, legitimacy of and obedience to digital copyright law becomes attainable.
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“CYBERANARCHY” IN THE DIGITAL AGE: DEVELOPING A SYSTEM OF
HUMAN (COPY)RIGHTS
MICHAEL L. BOYLE*
INTRODUCTION
Though “Cyberanarchy”1 may sound like the title to the latest high-budget, CGI
blockbuster, its legal referent—the theory that governments cannot feasibly regulate
the Internet2—is far from science fiction. Skepticism regarding Internet regulation is
neither new nor limited to the United States.3 Rather, courts, commentators, and
the popular press worldwide have grappled for years over the question of how to
impose rules on cyberspace.4
While current law establishes a framework for penalizing digital copyright
infringement,5 to date, online enforcement mechanisms remain ineffective.6 The
impact of widespread digital infringement goes beyond obvious economic
implications,7 fostering a pervasive, almost blasé cultural attitude towards online
copyright infringement.
* © Michael L. Boyle 2013. J.D. Candidate, May 2013 The John Marshall Law School; B.A.
Philosophy and B.A. Communications, May 2009, Loyola University Maryland. To my mother,
whose love and support acts as a beacon lighting my way in life; to my father, who instilled in me at
an early age “illegitimi non carborundum”; to Ross Drath, the best editor a capricious author like
myself could hope for; to my friends, colleagues, and mentors all of whom have shaped my success in
countless ways; and finally, to the editorial team at The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law for their assistance in making this Comment possible: thank you.
1 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1199–1201
(1998). Professor Goldsmith coined the term “cyberanarchy” in this pivotal piece, exploring the
ontological notion of cyberspace regulation.
2 Id. at 1201; contra David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1365, 1371 (2002).
3 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
L.J. 911, 915 (1996); John Parry Barlow, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
4 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) (“For a long time, the Internet’s enthusiasts have believed that it
would be largely immune from state regulation.”).
5 E.g., Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of
Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content and
Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 151–53 (2005); R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship
Between the ISP Safe Harbors and the Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
427, 429–30 (2009).
6 Infra Part II.A.; see, e.g., Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass
Suits, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html; Meng
Ding, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com: A Step Toward Copyright’s Tort Law Roots, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 373, 397–98 (2008).
7 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & HON. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 43–45 (2003). This book is far and away the most comprehensive
economic analysis of the effects intellectual property has on the free market. Accord Dawn R.
Albert, The Changing Face of IP Litigation, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ADAPTING TO NEW TRENDS, IMPROVING COURTROOM
TACTICS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS 59, 61 (2010). Since 2001, the
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Private efforts have been just as unsuccessful as government attempts to
effectively stem the tide of infringement.8 What exists now is an archetypal arms
race between copyright owners and those who consume and distribute unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material.9 Copyright owners collaborate with programmers to
create better copyright protection software.10 Infringers “crack” these protective
measures allowing once-protected material to be copied, downloaded, reproduced,
etc.11 The rampancy of online copyright infringement raises a difficult question of
fundamental motivation: Why are consumers partaking in unbridled copyright
infringement over the Internet? This question can be answered by exploring the
disparity between personal and societal standards;12 myriad factors are certainly at
play. This paper posits that several key factors, including the lack of a legitimate
governing enforcement body, the lack of peer disapproval of copyright infringement
via cyberspace, and the anonymous nature of conduct on the Internet, contribute to
the current state of anomie13 in this area.
Part I of this Comment explains the evolution of copyright regulation in
cyberspace. Further, it examines the attempts of traditional sociological theory to
explain why people obey law. Part II analyzes the technical difficulties the Internet
poses for enforcing copyright infringement. It also explores the legal framework that
copyright owners and governments have scrambled to create in the wake of this
descent into “cyberanarchy.” Part III proposes a bottom-up transformation of the
law, starting with governmental recognition of copyrights as a human right.
Additionally, it proposes increased accountability on rights holders attempting to
overexert their copyrights. Finally, it suggests that shifting the focus from legal
deterrence to a targeted and meaningful education program would legitimize current
copyright laws and radically improve enforcement rates.

costs associated with patent, trademark, and copyright litigation have increased forty-eight, thirtyeight, and seventy-three percent, respectively. Id.; see also Don. E. Tomlinson, Intellectual Property
in the Digital Age: The Piracy/counterfeiting Problem and Antipiracy and Anticounterfeiting
Measures, 8 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 3 (1999) (indicating that the U.S. economy loses
anywhere from $2.8 to $12.4 billion a year in piracy and/or counterfeiting of America’s intellectual
property).
8 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349–50 (2004).
9 See Russ VerSteeg, Viacom v. YouTube: Preliminary Observations, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43,
44–45 (2007) (cataloging the back-and-forth battle between technology and copyright protection).
10 See Tomlinson, supra note 7, at 10.
11 See Fernando Piera, IPR Protection of Computer Programs and Computer Software in the
Global Market, 12 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 15, 17 (2003); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 15 (1998)
(“The effectiveness of [section 103 of the DMCA] depends in large part on the rapid and dynamic
development of better technologies, including encryption-based technological protection measures.”).
12 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 11–16 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance
with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 226–
33 (1997) (applying Tyler’s sociological principles to the unique case of intellectual property).
13 See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 44 (J.A. Spaulding & G. Simpson
trans., Free Press 1951) (the term “anomie” literally translates to “without law” and refers to “social
instability caused by erosion of standards and values); accord Robert K. Merton, Social Structure
and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 672, 682 (1938).
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I. BACKGROUND
This section explores the evolution of copyright regulation in cyberspace.
Additionally, this section explores the traditional, sociological justifications behind
legal compliance.
A. Evolution of Copyright Regulation in Cyberspace
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the “Copyright
Act”)14 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (hereinafter the “DMCA”)15 govern
online copyright infringement. Because Congress enacted the Copyright Act far
before the advent of the Internet, it has several shortcomings with regard to
technology in the digital age.16 Congress passed the DMCA in 1998 as an effort to
harmonize the traditional copyright protections offered in the Copyright Act with
modern technologies, while compromising between the interests of content holders
and online service providers.17 The DMCA aimed to provide adequate copyright
protection with new and emerging digital age technologies. 18 Section 103 of the
DMCA added chapter twelve to the Copyright Act.19 As the Copyright Office points
out, this section of the DMCA imposes liability on those who circumvent

14 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
15 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
16 See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Frank H. Smith,
Tasini v. New York Times Co.: A Copyright, or a Right to Copy?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1093, 1097–
98 (1998) (noting that there is virtually no case law prior to Tasini interpreting § 201(c) in the
infringement involving modern digital technologies).
17 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (“ Title II clarifies the liability faced by service providers
who transmit potentially infringing material over their networks.”).
18 See WIPO One Year Later:
Assessing Consumer Access to Digital Entertainment on the
Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Telecomm., Trade and Consumer
Protection, 105th Cong. 12 (1999) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion
Picture Association of America (“MPAA”)). According to Mr. Valenti, the danger of Internet
copyright infringement can be summarized as follows:

Downloadable media piracy has two characteristics: One. . . [a] single pirate
with a single copy of a film can download thousands of copies to be downloaded in
a matter of hours. In analog, quality is degraded with each copy, but in digital the
thousandth copy is as pure and pristine as the original.
These copies can be mirrored, as the term of art, at sites all over the world,
making even more copies possible. Thus, with a single keystroke a pirate can do
millions of dollars worth of damage to the potential market for a motion picture,
even though the pirate may not make a nickel. . . [T]he equipment required to be
an Internet pirate is inexpensive, and it is portable. One of the most recent
innovations in obtaining illegal downloadable files is through the use of video and
audio search engines.
Id.

19 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860,
2863–76 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2012)).
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technological measures used to protect copyrighted materials.20 The statute divides
“technological measures” into two categories: measures preventing unauthorized
access to a copyrighted work and measures preventing unauthorized copying of a
copyrighted work.21 The Copyright Act does not completely outlaw measures
preventing unauthorized copying due to fair use considerations. 22 Rather, there are
several exceptions to its general provisions preventing unauthorized access to a
copyrighted work.23
Beyond these added protections against new “technological measures,” the
DMCA revised Title 17 of the United States Code to protect against the unauthorized
alteration of “copyright management information” (hereinafter “CMI”).24 CMI is the
identifying information of a copyrighted work.25 Section 1202 “prohibits the knowing
provision or distribution of false CMI, if done with the intent to induce, enable,
facilitate or conceal infringement.”26 It “bars the intentional removal or alteration of
CMI without authority, as well as the dissemination of CMI or copies of works,
knowing that the CMI has been removed or altered without authority.” 27
The DMCA also limits liability for copyright infringement by Internet service
providers (hereinafter “ISPs”).28 It does so by protecting certain types of conduct in
which ISPs commonly engage, including: “transitory communications,” “system
caching,” “storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users,” and
provision of “information location tools.”29 Under certain circumstances, the DMCA
bars monetary damages, as well as various forms of injunctive relief.30 The DMCA
also established guidelines for copyright holders to obtain subpoenas against ISPs to
disclose the identities of its allegedly infringing users.31 Nonetheless, “to ensure that
service providers are not placed in the position of choosing between limitations on
liability on the one hand and preserving the privacy of their subscribers, on the
other,” section 512 of Title 17 explicitly states that there is no requirement that “a
20 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998:
U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 2 (1998) [hereinafter DMCA SUMMARY], available at http://www
.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
21 Id. at 3–4.
22 Id. at 4. Fair use in cyberspace deserves a treatise of its own. Attempting to talk about it
here would make this far too cumbersome. There are several insightful resources that discuss it
thoroughly. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 283 (1996); Michael W. Carroll,
Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
23 See Carroll, supra note 22, at 1089–92.
24 DMCA SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 6–7.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 8. There is some confusion as to the meaning of ISPs in legal discussion. Courts have
interpreted the safe harbor provision of the DMCA to apply to both ISPs in the traditional sense
(that is, companies which provide Internet access to individuals and organizations) and ISPs in the
unconventional sense (e.g. websites, cyberlockers, torrent clients, etc.). Compare Viacom Int’l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2012) (defining ISP in the traditional sense), with UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the
DMCA safe harbor applied to the operator of a website).
29 DMCA SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 8.
30 Id. at 9.
31 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2012).
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service provider . . . monitor its service or access material in violation of law (such as
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act) in order to be eligible for any of the
liability limitations.”32
In his definitive work, Why People Obey the Law, Tom R. Tyler isolates several
justifications behind a populous’ obedience to the law.33 Tyler separates these
justifications into two separate “perspectives”—instrumental and normative.34
Instrumental perspectives are those known as “deterrence literature”: If people
break the law, the state has the power to fine, imprison, and otherwise make their
lives a little less pleasant.35 Traditionally, sociologists took these instrumental
perspectives into consideration when analyzing what motivates people to obey laws.36
Tyler’s study, however, focused more on the normative perspectives of legal
obedience.37 In short, his study “is concerned with the influence of what people
regard as just and moral as opposed to what is in their self-interest . . . [with]
examin[ing] the connection between normative commitment to legal authorities and
law-abiding behavior.”38
This “normative perspective” focuses on peoples’
internalized norms of justice and obligation. 39 Coupled with instrumental factors,
these normative factors show that beyond the legitimacy of the government making
the rules, obedience to a set of laws is dependent upon the populous’ view of
morality.40
This observation is not a new one. Past scholars wrote extensively about the
mixture of legitimacy and personal morality required to create a legal system with
high compliance rates.41 As H.L.A. Hart observed, peoples’ obedience to the law
derives “from a variety of motives: some from prudential calculation that the
sacrifices are worth the gains, some from a disinterested interest in the welfare of
others, and some because they look upon the rules as worthy of respect in
themselves.”42 In the context of digital copyright law, however, several questions are

DMCA SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 9.
See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12, at 3; Tyler, Compliance with
Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 234 (discussing the effectiveness of the threat of
punishment to enforce intellectual property rights).
34 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12, at 3.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 4.
40 Id. at 165.
32
33

The instrumental perspective is clearly insufficient to explain people’s views
about the legitimacy of authority and their behavioral compliance with the law.
Citizens act as naïve moral philosophers, evaluating authorities and their actions
against abstract criteria of fairness. The instrumental conceptions of the person
that have recently dominated discussions of legal issues are incomplete.
Id.
41 Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 361, 398 (2001); see also Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR.
L. REV. 391, 398 (2000).
42 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 197 (1961).
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bound to arise: What is the general view of morality for such a diverse community?43
Can an online governing body provide the legitimacy needed to properly enforce
copyrights? Do the aforementioned “instrumental” perspectives provide insight in
catalyzing deterrence when copyright holders have stopped relying on codified
models of enforcement?44
B. The Problem of Cyberspace Anonymity
Before the Internet, never was there such a readily available communication
medium geared towards anonymous use.45 Scholars have examined this issue from a
multitude of angles.46 The idea of anonymity and lawlessness has also been
discussed by academics to an encompassing extent.47 In relation to a legal obedience
model such as Tyler’s, an arena that allows effortless anonymity drastically alters
the question of consequences. That is, if an undesirable consequence occurs (in our
case, copyright infringement) in an anonymous-user system, a user is less likely to be
held responsible for their actions. If there is no positive identity, there is no one
person (or entity, or corporation, etc.) to hold responsible for the action.48
A recent case, Liberty Media Holdings, LLC. v. Does 1–59, illustrates the
conflicting interests of anonymity and copyrights. 49
Under the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Internet service providers cannot release
subscriber information without a court order.50 The court, in attempting to balance
the plaintiff’s injury against the right to anonymous speech, cited to Columbia

43 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:
Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (2004) (discussing the relationship between
public morality and government regulation); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 890 (2003) (“The same moral diversity that makes particular judicial
interpretations of liberty, equality, and democracy controversial will typically preclude a
supermajority consensus from forming on specific constitutional language-and supermajorities are
needed to distinguish constitutionalism from the radical democracy these critics prefer.”).
44 See, e.g., McBride & Smith, supra note 6.
45 See generally Kraig J. Marton et. al., Protecting One’s Reputation—How to Clear a Name in a
World Where Name Calling is so Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV. 53, 68 (2010) (discussing the “difficulty of
verifying users’ identities” in light of both online anonymity and the ease of posing as someone
else); see also Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101,
102, 102 (1997) (highlighting the tension between First Amendment rights to remain anonymous
and to “share and receive information that otherwise may be harmful or embarrassing to the
sender” with the harm anonymity causes by allowing “‘cyber-criminals’ to shield themselves from
accountability and responsibility”).
46 See Dr. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders on, or Border Around—The Future of the
Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 343, 377 (2006) (“Today’s technology with its portability and high
level of anonymity provides a perfect environment for so-called fraudulent evasions or fraude à la
loi.”).
47 See M.E. Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: Deindividuation, Incivility
and Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy, Paper presented at Annual Conference of the
European Institute for Computer Anti-virus Research (EICAR), Munich, Germany, at 2 (1998),
available at http://www.mekabay.com/overviews/anonpseudo.pdf.
48 See Svantesson, supra note 46, at 377–78.
49 Liberty Media Holdings, LLC. v. Does 1–59, 2011 WL 292128, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011).
50 Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) (2012).
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Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, which articulated a four-part test.51 First, the
plaintiff should attempt to identify the defendant with enough specificity so that the
court can determine the defendant is a person or entity subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction.52 Next, plaintiff would identify previous attempts to locate the
anonymous defendant.53 Plaintiff should then show, “to the Court’s satisfaction,” that
the complaint can survive a motion to dismiss. 54 If the plaintiff satisfies the
aforementioned requirements, then the plaintiff can request limited discovery to
ascertain the identity of the defendant.55
The plaintiff in the Seescandy.com case first identified a connection between the
multiple named webhost entities and an individual named “Ravi.” 56 Next, the
plaintiff exhibited a good faith effort at locating “Ravi” through attempted telephone
calls and emails to the numbers and email addresses listed on the domain
registrations.57 Third, the plaintiff demonstrated that its complaint would survive a
motion to dismiss by exhibiting that “an act giving rise to civil liability actually
occurred,” that is, an entity infringed upon the plaintiff’s trademark at the time the
plaintiff filed the complaint.58 Therefore, the court found the plaintiff’s request for
limited discovery proper.59 While the court ultimately sided with Liberty Media
Holdings, requiring the ISP to disclose the identities of named Does, courts have gone
both ways on this issue.60
Moreover, because citizens’ right to anonymous speech is not absolute, a
secondary market exists offering myriad services and protections to protect
consumers’ identities.61 Services such as proxies allow for users to hide their
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses62 or reroute their information through an anonymous
IP address nowhere near the user’s physical location. 63 This back and forth between
the desire for anonymity and copyright holders’ expectation of copyright enforcement

51 Liberty Media Holdings, 2011 WL 292128, at *1; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185
F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
52 Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
53 Id. at 579.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 580.
56 Id. at 576, 579.
57 Id. at 579.
58 Id. at 580.
59 Id.
60 Compare Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 434–35 (Md. 2009) (holding
circuit court judge inappropriately denied a motion to quash/motion for protective order regarding
subpoena requiring plaintiff to identify five Internet forum participants by name), and Mobilisa, Inc.
v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 715 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (remanding decision by superior court that ordered
defendant to provide identity of one of its account holders), with Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–
40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that person who uses the Internet to engage in
copyright infringement is engaging in exercise of speech only to a limited extent and that such
person’s identity is not protected from disclosure by the First Amendment).
61 See, e.g., Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, 11 J. INTERNET L. 22, 22
(2010) (examining the legal ramifications of free anonymity software to Internet users’ ability to
break the law online); Bryce Clayton Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in
Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2011) (discussing reasonable expectations of
privacy in digital communications).
62 Abbott, supra note 61, at 22.
63 Id.

[12:424 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

432

creates yet another barrier to content owners’ efficient monetization of the digital
markets for their works.64
C. YouTube: A Vehicle of Content Sharing
The ebb and flow of copyright infringement in a digital context can best be
examined through an analysis of YouTube. 65 YouTube allows users to upload and
share videos.66 The social impact of this service has been enormous.67 Never before
have individuals had the power to self-produce and self-publish to a worldwide
audience at such a low cost.68
While anyone with a registered YouTube account can post videos, the company
enacted a series of measures to ensure compliance with its internal “Community
Guidelines” (“CGs”) and copyright laws.69 The YouTube CGs prohibit several types of
videos.70 During the upload process, YouTube issues a warning to users not to upload

64 Compare Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 634 (2008) (examining emerging markets within
the Internet and their effect on infringement), with Philip S. Corwin, Lawrence M. Hadley, P2P:
The Path to Prosperity, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 649, 649 (2004) (suggesting that only through
embracing peer-to-peer technology will the entertainment industry be able to begin to negate the
economic impact of infringement), and Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me If You Can:
An Analysis of New Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation to Combat the Sale of
Counterfeit Products on the Internet, 32 PACE L. REV. 567, 568 (2012) (observing that pressuring
payment systems companies to shutting infringing online marketplaces shows promise in the online
world of enforcement).
65 Philip Kunz, Whose Tube? – A Contributory Copyright Infringement Analysis of the Pending
Lawsuit, Robert Tur v. YouTube Inc., 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 167, 167 (2006).
66 Id. at 171.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_
guidelines (last visited Mar 7, 2013). In relevant part:

We’re not asking for the kind of respect reserved for nuns, the elderly, and brain
surgeons. We mean don’t abuse the site. Every cool new community feature on
YouTube involves a certain level of trust. We trust you to be responsible, and
millions of users respect that trust. Please be one of them. . . . Okay, this one is
more about us than you. YouTube staff review flagged videos 24 hours a day,
seven days a week to determine whether they violate our Community Guidelines.
When they do, we remove them. Sometimes a video doesn’t violate our
Community Guidelines, but may not be appropriate for everyone. These videos
may be age-restricted. Accounts are penalized for Community Guidelines
violations and serious or repeated violations can lead to account termination. If
your account is terminated, you won’t be allowed to create any new accounts. For
more information about how the Community Guidelines are enforced and the
consequences of violating them, please visit the Help Center.
Id.

70 Id.
These include copyrighted materials uploaded without the holder’s consent,
pornography, animal abuse, and certain other “shock videos.”
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copyrighted content that is not under their control.71 YouTube also has a takedown
notice posted pursuant to the DMCA. 72
This has not stopped lawsuits against YouTube by a number of high profile
organizations.73 The most notable lawsuit is Viacom International v. YouTube, Inc.74
In this lawsuit, Viacom sued YouTube for $1 billion dollars for copyright
infringement.75 The district court, ruling in favor of summary judgment for
YouTube, found that YouTube was protected under the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA.76 That court concluded that
the critical question is whether the statutory phrases “actual knowledge
that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network
is infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) mean a general awareness that there
are infringements (here, claimed to be widespread and common), or rather
mean actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements of individual items. . . . [T]he phrases “actual knowledge that
the material or an activity” [infringes a copyright, and] “facts or
circumstances” indicating infringing activity, describe knowledge of specific
and identifiable infringements of particular individual items. Mere
knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough.’77
Viacom appealed.78 The Second Circuit took the opportunity “to clarify the
contours of the ‘safe harbor’ provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) that limits the liability of online service providers for copyright infringement
that occurs ‘by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.’” 79 Judge
Cabranes substantially affirmed the district court’s interpretation of “actual
knowledge.”80 Although the body of case law interpreting the knowledge provisions of
the DMCA safe harbor provision is sparse, other jurisdictions agree with Judge
Cabranes’ analysis.81
Beyond the legal protection proffered by the courts, YouTube utilizes several
internal safeguards to mitigate any claim of vicarious liability and to ensure lower

Id.
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
73 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (including
The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. as named plaintiff); Reti Televisive Italiane contro
YouTube, Trib. Roma, 24 novembre 2009, n. 54218/08 (It.) (MediaSet v. YouTube in Italy).
74 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
75 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 5, Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (No. 07 CV 2103).
76 Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
77 Id. at 519, 523.
78 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2012).
79 Id. at 25 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012)).
80 Id. at 30.
81 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011).
71
72
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instances of copyright infringement on its the website.82 Through its algorithmic
juggernaut,83 YouTube’s Content ID “let[s] rights owners:


Identify user-uploaded videos comprised entirely OR partially of
their content, and



Choose, in advance, what they want to happen when those videos
are found. Make money from them. Get stats on them. Or block
them from YouTube altogether.84

YouTube accomplishes this by allowing rights holders to upload audio and video
content they own, describe the uploaded content with holder-defined metadata, and
direct YouTube towards a course of action when Content ID technology discovers
potentially infringing material.85
Content ID is a powerful technology. According to YouTube, Content ID “scans
over 100 years of video every day.”86 Over three thousand content owners use
Content ID to safeguard their copyrights. 87 Over one-third of monetized views on
YouTube come from Content ID flagged video.88 Upon first introduction, when
Content ID flagged a potentially infringing video, the content owner chose from three
modes of action: take down the video, attach advertising with the video for a profit,
or allow the video to remain online while receiving up-to-date viewing statistics about
the video.89
The main criticism of this approach was that users had no effective remedy to
challenge suspect takedown requests. 90 Little, if any, consideration was given to
users protected by fair use,91 which the Supreme Court has categorized as an
affirmative defense.92 Accordingly, under certain circumstances, use of a copyright
that would otherwise be infringing is protected as “fair use.” 93
With regard to complaints by users of overreaching takedown notices, perhaps
the most public, if not the most famous example occurred when Universal Music Corp
See Content ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, http://support.google.com/youtube/bin/answer.py
?hl=en&answer=2797370 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). Content ID works by scanning videos uploaded
by rights holders to an internal catalog. Id. Afterwards, when a future video is uploaded, Content
ID compares the newly uploaded video to content within its catalog. Id. When Content ID matches
a video to third-party content, the “copyright notices” section of the uploader’s YouTube account
page will include an entry notifying her of the development and of the copyright owner’s policy. Id.
If she disagrees with the match, she can dispute it. Id. Then the normal appeals process starts.
84 See Content ID, supra note 82.
85 Id.
86 Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2013).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Content ID, supra note 82.
90 Patrick McKay, YouTube’s New Content ID Appeals Process: Not as Useful as You Might
Think, FAIRUSETUBE.ORG (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://fairusetube.org/articles/26-appealsprocess-not-useful.
91 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). This concern still exists. See McKay, supra note 90.
92 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
93 Id. at 594.
82
83
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(“Universal”), acting on behalf of The Artist Formerly Known as Prince (“Prince”),
filed a takedown notice with YouTube demanding that a mother, Stephanie Lenz,
remove a video of her infant dancing to Prince’s song, “Let’s Go Crazy.” 94 YouTube
complied.95 Outraged, Lenz filed a DMCA counter-notification with YouTube
demanding her video be reposted,96 which YouTube did six weeks later. 97 Following
the repost, Lenz filed suit against Universal claiming misrepresentation under “17
U.S.C. § 512(f) and tortious interference with her contract with YouTube.” 98
Surviving Universal’s motion to dismiss, the court found that Lenz pleaded
sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss.99
In the time since Lenz initially filed her suit against Universal, YouTube made
several changes to its takedown policy. To further coax a free market option to
traditional litigation, YouTube recently introduced a more comprehensive appeals
process for those users who believe that their uploaded content either: (a) does not
infringe any copyright, or (b) would be infringing but for the defense of fair use. 100
Prior to this this new process, a user whose appeal was denied by the allegedly
affected copyright owner was left with little recourse.101 Under the new system, if a
user challenges a takedown notice filed directly with YouTube by a copyright holder,
the holder now has two options: (1) release the claim or (2) file a formal DMCA
notification.102 If the holder files a formal DMCA notification, “the video will be taken
down and the uploader will receive a copyright strike.” 103 Multiple strikes can lead to
the suspension of a user’s YouTube account. 104
Although YouTube found some limited protection from the appellate court in
Viacom International v. YouTube, Inc.,105 and created internal protective measures
subsequent a takedown notice, users continue to upload content to YouTube daily—
both infringing and fairly used.106 It will be interesting to see if Content ID will
effectively reduce infringement, and if so, whether similar technology could be

94 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying
Universal’s motion to dismiss).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1153.
99 Id. at 1156.
100 Frederic Lardinois, YouTube Changes its Content ID Appeals Process, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 3,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/03/youtube-changes-its-content-id-appeals-process/.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2012). The issue is more
nuanced than this but is beyond the purview of this Comment. On remand, the Second Circuit
expressed its interest in whether a jury could find YouTube had “actual knowledge” of infringement.
106 See Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
copyright/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). Although Google does not release the number of allegedly
infringing materials uploaded to their website (ostensibly because their ContentID technology did
not recognize it and thus they are unaware of the uploaded content), through the use of their
“Transparency Report,” Google offers insight to what rightsholders claim the most amount of
infringement online.
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applied to other classic avenues of infringement.107 As of now, however, Content ID
may best be regarded as YouTube’s attempt to divorce itself even further from
liability.
While the DMCA sets out penalties for infringing users,108 to date there has been
no demonstration of its efficacy as an enforcement tool.109 Infringing behavior
continues to flourish,110 especially in more traditional vehicles of content sharing.111
Coupled with the shifting power structure articulated by Tyler’s “normative
perspective” of why people obey laws and the problems with cyber anonymity,
current enforcement inefficiencies create an environment ripe for copyright
infringement.112 The next section of this Comment analyzes the effect of said
inefficiencies on copyright infringement in cyberspace.
II. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the difficulties of regulating copyrightable materials in
cyberspace. By examining the troubles copyright holders have had with enforcing
their copyrights digitally, it becomes apparent that current legal options offered to
copyright holders are insufficient and ineffective.

107 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal & Jason M. Schultz, The Unending Search for the Optimal
Infringement Filter, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 83 (2012); Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the
First Amendment: How Internet Service Providers Leverage Their Status As Both Content Creators
and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1279 (2010).
108 See Julie Hilden, Anonymity Versus Law Enforcement: The Fight Over Subpoenaing Alleged
Downloaders’ Names From Internet Service Providers, FINDLAW.COM (Oct. 1, 2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20031001.html.
109 Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break:
On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 166 (2010).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 150.
112 See Frank Pasquale, Toward an Ecology of Intellectual Property:
Lessons from
Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright’s Commons, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 78, 79 (2006):

Responding to decisions restricting fair use, critical IP scholars have developed
innovative First Amendment-based arguments for extending it in the digital
realm. Some have also proposed legislative and regulatory schemes to protect an
intellectual commons. While acknowledging the value of these approaches, [I]
propose a different route: informing “fourth factor” (or “effect on the market”)
analysis with economic assessments drawn from efforts to value physical, realspace commons.
Environmental economists have developed sophisticated
methods of measuring the value of commons in natural resources. Application of
the techniques and concepts developed in environmental economics to “effect on
the market” analysis in fair use cases would enable courts to recognize the Paretooptimal features of an intellectual commons which restrictions on fair use
threaten.
Id.
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A. The DMCA: Or, “No Church in the Wild.”113
Since implementation, the DMCA faced much scrutiny from scholars,
lawmakers, and the civilian press alike. 114 Although past criticisms have focused on
fair use considerations,115 censorship,116 and stunting innovation,117 this Comment
will focus its criticisms purely on enforcement. The concern that the DMCA is
unenforceable is not new, and in fact was raised before the DMCA was even
enacted.118 Some critics have even likened ISPs to the United States Postal Service
in saying: “[J]ust like the postal service cannot (and indeed should not) monitor the
contents of all the envelopes it handles, it is simply not possible for an infrastructure
provider to monitor whether the millions of electronic messages it transmits daily
have been authorized.”119 In the same way that it would be unrealistic to expect the
postal service to ensure strict legal compliance with every letter mailed, it would be
prohibitively expensive (both in resources and manpower), as well as legally and
morally impractical from a privacy standpoint, for ISPs to ensure copyright
compliance digitally.120
That is not to say there have not been legal “victories” for copyright holders. On
the contrary, several high profile cases have reiterated federal law’s commitment to
cyberspace copyrights.121 However, what, if any, long-term deterrent effects have
these cases had on copyright infringement in cyberspace? It seems that, at best,

113 Kanye
West
&
Jay-Z,
No
Church
in
the
Wild,
LYRICSMODE
http://www.lyricsmode.com/lyrics/k/kanye_west_jay_z/no_church_in_the_wild.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2013). The song, No Church in the Wild, essentially proposes that one must believe in a God for
that God to have any influence on one’s life. See id. It is this author’s belief that, by analogy,
without belief in a law, its influence is similarly compromised.
114 See Declan McCullagh, DMCA Critics Say Reform Still Needed, CNET (Dec. 17, 2002, 6:35
PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-978296.html; Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use?
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8
COMM. L. & POL‘Y 111, 111–12 (2003); Nate Anderson, Corporate Critics Feel the Stinging Lash of
DMCA Misuse, ARSTECHNICA (Oct 11, 2007, 9:27 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/
10/corporate-critics-feel-the-stinging-lash-of-dmca-misuse/.
115 See Imfeld, supra note 114.
116 See Anderson, supra note 114.
117 See McCullagh supra note 114.
118 See BRUCE A.
LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 149 (1995) (raising concerns about the WIPO treaty—the legal precursor to the
DMCA—and ISPs’ ability to effectively monitor infringement on their servers); Hannibal Travis,
Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 834–35 (2000).
119 Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 386 (1997).
120 Sonia Katyal, Filtering, Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 401,
410 (2009).
121 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.. 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming
district court’s rejection of a fair use defense in file sharing); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.
Supp. 2d 634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (enjoining Aimster’s file sharing service). Chief Judge Aspen
characterized Aimster’s file sharing service as “the facilitation of and contribution to copyright
infringement on a massive scale.” In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 638; see also Arista Records, Inc.
v. Mp3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV.4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).
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these victories represent the compliant façade on a building constructed of
scofflaws.122
Rights holders’ attempts to stop vehicles of copyright infringement have largely
treated individual symptoms of the problem without addressing the underlying
cause.123 For example, last year, federal agents shuttered Megaupload.com. 124 The
website acted as a host for infringing material. 125 At the time of seizure, Megaupload
visitors accounted for four percent of all Internet traffic. 126 Although the federal
attack focused only on Megaupload, it was effective in its ability to deter payment
system operators and advertisers from doing business with other cyberlocker sites. 127
Accordingly, a large percentage of cyberlockers like Megaupload are now defunct. 128
Those still functioning have greatly altered their policies in the face of public and
governmental objections.129
While agents were able to remove this “big fish” of content hosting sites,
numerous other sites continued to operate. 130 Moreover, YouTube is not the only
vehicle of copyright infringement, nor the most popular. 131 Torrenting still remains
one of the most effective infringement vehicles available online. 132 Torrent
aggregators, such as The Pirate Bay, not only allow users to search for and download
video, audio, and software, but also allow users to rank uploaders as “VIPs” or
“Trustworthy” to reduce the risk of downloading content tracked by rights holders
and authorities, or harmful content.133 While federal suits going after individual

122 See Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 538 (2003) (describing such
legal battles as “pyrrhic victor[ies] for the recording industry”); Matthew Green, Napster Opens
Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the
Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 823–24 (2002) (noting that copyright holders have been weary of
pursuing legal action against infringing users as opposed to the services that cater to them).
123 See, e.g., Kevin C. Hormann, The Death of the DMCA? How Viacom v. YouTube May Define
the Future of Digital Content, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1345, 1374 (2009).
124 David Kravets, Feds Shutter Megaupload, Arrest Executives, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:14
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/megaupload-indicted-shuttered/.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Nate Anderson, Google Cut Off Megaupload’s Ad Money Voluntarily Back in 2007,
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 20, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/google-cut-offmegauploads-ad-money-voluntarily-back-in-2007/.
128 See LimeWire Shuts Down After Losing Court Battle With the RIAA, TORRENTFREAK (Oct.
26, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/limewire-loses-court-battle-with-riaa-shuts-down-101026/.
129 See,
e.g., Fighting Against The Sharing Of Pirated And Illegal Content,
STOPFILELOCKERS.COM, http://stopfilelockers.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
130 Eliot Van Buskirk, File Sharing Sites Cast Themselves into Exile Over MegaUpload Bust,
GIZMODO (Jan. 23, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5878653/file-sharing-sites-cast-themselvesinto-exile-over-megaupload-bust.
131 See Shelly Rosenfeld, Taking the Wind out of the Movie Pirates’ Sails: The Constitutionality
of Senate Bill 3804, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57, 63 (2011) (describing the illegal peer-to-peer
website, The Pirate Bay, as “a notorious conduit for infringement”).
132 Salil K. Mehra, Keep America Exceptional! Against Adopting Japanese and European-Style
Criminalization of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 811, 821
(2011) (discussing the difficulties of international enforcement with websites such as The Pirate
Bay).
133 Wendy Boswell, The Pirate Bay, ABOUT.COM, http://websearch.about.com/od/torrentsearch/
p/pirate-bay.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
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users comprising a Torrent “swarm” have seen some success, effective enforcement
against webhosts remains sparse.
Although legal action has been taken against individual users of file-sharing
software,134 there is yet to be any legal action taken against individual infringing
users of services such as YouTube. This very well might be because of the transitory
nature of video posting on YouTube.135 That is, users watch over 4 billion hours of
video footage on YouTube each month.136 Seventy-two hours of video are uploaded to
YouTube every minute.137 Over eight hundred million unique users visit the website
each month,138 with seventy percent of YouTube’s traffic coming from outside the
United States.139 The sheer amount of content uploaded each day, combined with the
number of users uploading the content, acts as a legal and economic quagmire for
rights holders interested in going after individual YouTube users.140 To rights
holders, YouTube offers an enforcement mechanism that is more efficient and
effective than litigation.141
Issues of cyberspace anonymity also raise concerns over cyberspace legal
enforcement.142 These issues are multifaceted. 143 Although YouTube requires users
who upload content to register with its site, technology exists to keep their identities
hidden from the website.144 YouTube admittedly does everything within its power to
deter uploading infringing content on its website, however, it has yet to develop or
implement security measures to protect its content from being “ripped” off the
website and downloaded by a third party.145 If utilizing one of these third-party
134 See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008),
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later (noting that within five years of beginning its
legal campaign against illegal downloaders, the RIAA had “filed, settled, or threatened legal actions
against at least 30,000 individuals”).
135 See Statistics, supra note 86.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Steven Seidenberg, Copyright in the Age of Youtube, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2009, 10:29 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/copyright_in_the_age_of_youtube/print/.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., Charles B. Vincent, Cybersmear II: Blogging and the Corporate Rematch Against
John Doe Version 2.006, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 987, 1001 (2006) (discussing the legal issues of
cyberspace anonymity in the context of defamation); Rodney A.
Smolla, 1 Law of
Defamation § 4:86.50 (2d ed. 2012) (“To fail to recognize that the First Amendment right to speak
anonymously should be extended to communications on the Internet would ignore the First
Amendment values of anonymity, and the strong push for privacy online in modern American
society.”).
143 See Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for Filesharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 52 (2004) (“If policy makers insist on making illegal sociallyacceptable conduct, technology will adapt to the legal environment either by circumventing the legal
norm or by making enforcement either impossible or too costly.”).
144 See, e.g., THE TOR PROJECT, http://www.torproject.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
Tor,
originally developed for use by the U.S. Navy to protect its classified communications, today
champions the right of anonymity on the Internet.
About Tor, THE TOR PROJECT,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
145 A Google search of the terms “YouTube Rip” or “YouTube Save” returns first page results
with websites that provide the service or direct information on how to save a YouTube video (or
audio) to one’s computer. Ironically enough, now that YouTube has partnered with copyright
holders such as Vevo, to provide exclusive, high-quality content, users now have the option to “rip”
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sources, an infringing user offers even less identifying information to YouTube than a
registered user.
When one begins to observe actions of digital copyright infringement as illegal,
yet largely unprosecutable due to the technological shortcomings of identification and
deterrence, it is not so much a question anymore as to how people can get away with
infringement. Considered in light of sociological examinations of societal norms,
copyright infringement in the digital age becomes the twenty-first century equivalent
to jaywalking: quick, pervasive, and guilt-free.146
B. Social Norms (or the Lack Thereof)
Beyond the aforementioned technological inadequacies plaguing copyright
enforcement, applying traditional sociological frameworks of legal disobedience to
current digital copyright laws leads one to the conclusion that, under the current
legal model, there cannot be a serious expectation of compliance with digital
copyright laws.147
The concern of compliance with copyright laws in the digital age has been
examined before.148 As mentioned in Part I, compliance with the law is based on a
number of factors, with personal morality and legitimacy of the governing body chief
among them.149 There exists a lack of connection between the current legal
framework, the populace it seeks to govern, and their personal views of morality and
the legitimacy of the state.
Under the current model of copyright enforcement, deterrence via threats of
large fines and imprisonment is the only internal impetus guiding people towards
law-abiding behavior.150 This method of enforcement is obviously ineffective.151 The
high-quality, high-definition renderings of some of the most in-demand music and videos available.
See e.g.,. LISTENTOYOUTUBE.COM, http://www.listentoyoutube.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013);
KEEPVIDKEEPVID.COM, http://www.keepvidkeepvId.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013); YOUTUBEMP3,
http://www.youtube-mp3.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
146 See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 220.
147 Id.
148 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Diane L. Zimmerman, Convenors’ Introduction:
The
Culture and Economics of Participation In An International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 6–7 (1997).
149 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12, at 19; Tyler, Compliance with
Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 224.
150 See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 221–22.
The conclusion that deterrence concerns have a clear, but minor, influence on lawrelated behavior is reinforced by the results of a review of research on the
antecedents of drug-related behavior. That review concludes that variance in the
certainty and severity of punishment accounts for approximately five percent of
the variance in drug-related behavior. In other words, since most of how people
react to laws is not linked to risk judgments, deterrence strategies based upon
changing such judgments will have, at best, a minor influence upon law-related
behavior.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
151 Id.
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key to legal compliance, as Tyler points out, is not so much a question of the
“objective risk of being caught,”152 but the “psychological estimates of risk.” 153 That
is, if people believe that performing an illegal action has a high probability of getting
them in trouble, they are less likely to do it, regardless of whether that “estimate of
risk” is accurate or not.154
In the copyright context, there appears to be a relatively low belief that
infringing behavior will result in apprehension, conviction, or a sizable monetary
penalty.155 This may be for a number of reasons. First, perhaps the most infamous
copyright holder, the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), stopped
filing suit against individuals in 2008. 156 Additionally, as Tyler points out, “[p]eople
have greater opportunities to break rules in certain situations.” 157
The
aforementioned technological shortcomings, coupled with near-anonymity and poor
legal framework, create an almost perfect storm of factors favoring low psychological
estimations of the risks attendant to infringement.158
The lack of connection between personal moral considerations and digital
copyright law, on first sight, is rather concerning. While some make the comparison
that copyright infringement is no different than stealing,159 overwhelming public
perception seems to perpetuate a disconnection between theft of a physical good and
copying a digital resource.160 Some behaviorists have attributed this to the lack of

Id. at 222.
Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 234.
156 See, e.g., McBride & Smith, supra note 6 (“Though the industry group is reserving the right
to sue people who are particularly heavy file sharers, or who ignore repeated warnings, it expects its
lawsuits to decline to a trickle.”).
157 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 223.
158 Id. at 224.
159 Jon
Healey,
File
Sharing
or
Stealing?,
L.A. TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2008),
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-healey18feb18,0,5092348.story.
160 See Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 2006 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶¶ 1, 3.
152
153

[T]he famous Stanford law professor Paul Goldstein engages his students in
discussion of copyright law. Goldstein first asks his students, would they take a
book from a bookstore even if they were certain that they would not be caught?
Overwhelmingly, the students say no. Goldstein then asks them to suppose the
book was available electronically on the Internet. Would they make a copy of the
electronic book, again certain that they would not be caught? This time a majority
say yes, including those who had answered no to the first question.
....
Professor Goldstein’s two hypotheticals present his students with similar
circumstances. From the students’ perspective, both taking a physical copy of the
book and making an electronic copy yield the same result: a copy of the book
obtained at no cost to them. Of course, the law proscribes both, one as theft and
the other as infringement. Yet . . . the students seem to intuitively distinguish
theft from infringement.
Id.
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“personal contact” between a copyright infringer and their victims or the subject of
their infringement.161
Some behaviorists posit that the further removed a behavior is from our
ancestral background, the more amoral, or morally ambiguous, the act tends to be. 162
While acts such as physically taking another’s property or life are directly linked
with our ancestral heritage, one can easily suggest that the idea of making an
unauthorized digital copy that does not deprive the original owner of anything other
than profits gained and control of distribution is a foreign concept with regard to our
intuitive morality. As Tyler notes, “[i]n the case of intellectual property law, these
findings imply that one crucial problem is the lack of a public feeling that breaking
intellectual property laws is wrong. In the absence of such a conception, there is
little reason for people to follow intellectual property laws.” 163
This lack of moral connection may also be linked to ideas of fairness. 164 For
example, it seems that much copyright infringement arises out of a distorted idea of
fair use.165 Intellectual property law, in the digital context, generally operates
outside of a “moral climate that supports formal laws.” 166
Legitimacy of the State is also at issue. Online copyright infringement is a
worldwide problem.167 While the United States has been on the forefront of ensuring
copyrights are respected and enforced, as previously mentioned, attempts at doing so
have been futile at best. A view that the State is enforcing legitimate authority over
its populace is nearly as important as the connection between law and personal
morality.168
This legitimacy has been lacking with regard to the enforcement of copyright
laws in cyberspace. It is not a matter of whether or not a legitimate authority exists.
Rather, there are several issues with the current enforcement regime. First, as
previously mentioned, the RIAA has switched its enforcement strategy so many
times since the initial rounds of lawsuits began in 2003, that there really is no legal
consequence for infringing users to expect. Additionally, public respect for the law
and legal authorities has waned in recent decades.169
161 See Joshua D. Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE
INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338, 349–50 (Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence &
Stephen Stich. eds. 2005) (proposing that a physical connection helps establish innate feelings of
morality).
162 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 517, 517 (2002).
163 See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 226.
164 Id. at 227 (“[T]he law can have an important symbolic function if it accords with public
views about what is fair, but it loses that power as the formal law diverges from public morality.”).
165 See id. at 228.
166 Id.
167 Debbie Legall, Restricted Content, INT’L B. ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx
?ArticleUid=D5024924-65D4-486E-8164-97325FE9168D (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
168 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 229.
169 SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 1–3 (1983); see also Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property
Laws, supra note 12, at 235. Such dissatisfaction with legal authority in America is multifaceted,
complex, and certainly too deep an issue to adequately describe in this Comment. See, e.g., Eric
Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
63 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why? The
Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1997); Austin
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The very nature of the Internet exacerbates this lack of legitimacy. While the
United States, at the very least, attempts to create laws with aims to protect
intellectual property rights, other such nations are not as concerned or receptive to
these rights.170 Although the United States may eventually and successfully enjoin
infringement through its federal court system, jurisdictional and censorship issues
arise when websites wholly owned and operated by foreign entities are blocked by the
American court system.
III. PROPOSAL: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF COPYRIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
To review, we are left with a situation where, despite laws and attempts at legal
enforcement, copyright infringement in cyberspace is as rampant now as it has ever
been.171 Despite efforts to legislate around the problem, safe harbors and loopholes
in the DMCA effectively bar copyright holders from going after ISPs providing
vehicles of infringement.172 So how does the United States protect copyrights in the
digital age? A proposed framework exists: creating a connection between personal
morality and the law as well as a reaffirmation of legitimacy in the government. 173
Although legal devices such as strict liability have been suggested, 174 a shift
toward a more European “natural law” alternative 175 and a shift away from the
“copyright-as-property rhetoric”176 is more effective. This Comment suggests that a

Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
427, 428–29 (1977). Suffice it to say, the RIAA lawsuits did the United States government no favors
in fostering a feeling of goodwill and voluntary compliance towards digital copyright laws. See Fred
von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-people-turns-lawsuits-3-strikes; see also
Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1388 (“[I]t remains unclear whether the
industry will actually abandon those tactics or whether it will only scale back some of its prior
efforts to alleviate the public outcry.”).
170 See Swiss Govt: Downloading Movies and Music Will Stay Legal, TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 2,
2011), http://torrentfreak.com/swiss-govt-downloading-movies-and-music-will-stay-legal-111202/.
171 See Declan McCullagh, RIAA: U.S. Copyright Law ‘Isn’t Working’, CNET (Aug. 23, 2010,
2:48 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20014468-38.html (complaining that the DMCA is rife
with loopholes, RIAA President Cary Sherman is quoted as saying, “The DMCA isn’t working for
content people at all . . . . You cannot monitor all the infringements on the Internet. It’s simply not
possible. We don’t have the ability to search all the places infringing content appears . . . .”).
172 See RIAA Increasingly Unhappy with DMCA, THECMU (Nov. 10, 2011, 11:36 AM),
http://www.thecmuwebsite.com/article/riaa-increasingly-unhappy-with-dmca/.
173 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 234.
174 See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1983)
(affirming district court’s ruling “‘innocent copying’ can nevertheless constitute an infringement”);
See also Eugene C. Kim, YouTube: Testing the Safe Harbors of Digital Copyright Law, 17 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 147–48 (2007) (discussing whether YouTube’s posting of infringing content
would be direct or secondary infringement).
175 See Manesh, supra note 160, at 101. But see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (“The enactment of copyright legislation . . . is not based upon
any natural right that the author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.”).
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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focus on copyrights as human rights may be able to strike the most resonant chord in
the context of both morality and legitimacy.
If someone had made the suggestion ten years ago that intellectual property
rights should be placed on the same plane as human rights, it would have sounded
glib, at best. In the past few years, however, the global public developed an
overwhelming reliance on the Internet as a medium of both communication and
social change.177 This is symptomatic of the growing importance of the Internet as a
worldwide communication tool. Accordingly, this pervasive reliance on the Internet
for communication supports the notion that Internet access be considered a human
right.
The first step toward achieving copyright protection in cyberspace is the creation
of a moral framework that supports the current infringement laws. Also, recognizing
fair use protection and punishing overreaching copyright claims will help this
framework materialize. Finally, to achieve morality in cyberspace there needs to be
a common understanding between lawmakers and end-users. YouTube’s creation of
an internalized takedown appeals process serves as a city on a hill for not only an
increased respect for fair use, but also for a common understanding between
lawmakers and end-users.
A. Creating the Framework
As Tyler notes, the first step in creating a moral framework for law is “creat[ing]
and maintain[ing] a moral climate that supports formal laws.”178 In traditional legal
contexts, Americans are culturally predisposed to support law abiding behavior.179
The real dichotomy, then, “is how such a culture [has failed to] be created in the area
of intellectual property law.”180 Threats alone have not achieved this end.181 What is
required is an integration of educational methods to spur critical thinking on issues
of morality in the digital context.182
Moral legitimacy cannot arise solely out of legislation espousing a position as
just.183 Instead, there must be a socially accepted moral framework that creates the
demand for legislation and not vice versa. In short, communal understanding of
moral standards begets effective legislation based in morality; legislation based in
morality does not precipitate a moral understanding and connection amongst a
populace.184
177 See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 135 (2001).
178 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 228.
179 Id. at 228–29.
180 Id. at 229.
181 Id. at 234.
182 See James R. Rest & Stephen J. Thoma, Relation of Moral Judgment Development to
Formal Education, 21 DEV. PSYCHOL. 709, 712 (1985); Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property
Laws, supra note 12, at 229 (“[W]e need to create an awareness of and commitment to the moral
principles that underlie formal laws. In particular, the public’s awareness of the reasons underlying
intellectual property rules needs to be developed more effectively, so that a basis for a positive moral
climate can be created.”).
183 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 231.
184 Id.
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Beyond the educational measures needed to establish a moral framework, there
must be a legitimizing factor for the authority attempting to enact the legislation. 185
To reestablish legitimacy, one must first identify the “antecedents of legitimacy.” 186
These antecedents primarily lie in “people’s judgments about the procedures through
which legal authorities make rules.”187
In the context of copyrights in cyberspace, a problem with the DMCA may arise
from the context in which it was created. 188 Lawmakers drafted the DMCA as the
result of negotiations between ISPs and copyright holders. One set of stakeholders
never involved with these talks is the group most affected by such legislation: the
end-users.189 Although critics raised this concern before the initial drafting of the
DMCA, these warnings went largely unheeded.
Contrarily, YouTube created an internal model of enforcement based directly on
the input and concerns of end-users. This arguably created a more efficient and
effective system of copyright enforcement by reducing the need for drawn out
litigation. It also takes into account end-users’ fair use of copyrighted content.190
Perhaps this experience should be a lesson in identifying relevant stakeholders.
That is, there can be little expectation of willful compliance if there exists no mutual
feeling of participation in the drafting and implementation of laws. 191 Rather,
legitimacy and trust stem from a combination of views of fairness combined with
participation.192 In this vein, it was wholly useful for YouTube to go beyond industry
insiders, law makers, and academics, and take end-user demands and concerns into
consideration when forging changes to the current cyberspace intellectual property
regime.

Id.
Id.
187 Id.; see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 65–66 (1988).
188 See Greg Sandoval, RIAA Lawyer Says DMCA May Need Overhaul, CNET (Nov 6, 2011, 8:59
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-57319344-261/riaa-lawyer-says-dmca-may-need-overhaul/.
Jennifer Pariser, RIAA Senior Vice President of Litigation, was quoted as saying, “I think Congress
got it right, but I think the courts are getting it wrong . . . . I think the courts are interpreting
Congress‘ statute in a manner that is entirely too restrictive of content owners‘ rights and too open
to [Internet] service providers.” Id.; see also Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link Is the Weakest
Link: Search Engine Caches Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y
U.S.A. 589, 599 (2009) (noting that “[a]fter several years of intense debates, a compromise was
eventually reached between the different stakeholders on the issue of the liability of Internet
intermediaries for online copyright infringements”).
189 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE
INTERNET 35–63 (2001) (proposing the public have its own copyright lawyer available to represent
them during the course of legislation drafting); Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 99, 115–19 (2006) (discussing the
warnings of The Working Group in drafting legislation without talking to all relevant stakeholders).
190 See What is Fair Use?, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2013).
191 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 232; see also JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 458–60 (1996) (positing that utilizing discourse within a democratic state offers
legitimacy through consensus).
192 Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 12, at 232.
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After lawmakers create a moral framework that supports current copyright law
and legitimizes the law by considering the end-user, there needs to be a proliferation
of morality in cyberspace.
B. Bolstering End-User Influence By Penalizing Overreaching Copyright Claims
For a long time now, commentators have expressed concerns that overaggressive copyright enforcement stifles fair use.193 That is, with fair use being an
affirmative defense and not a categorical right, end-users unaware of the proper way
to raise the defense are at an extreme disadvantage to major rights holders. 194 One
scholar describes this enforcement overreach as “Copyfraud.”195 That is, deep-pocket
rights holders, for the sake of efficiency, tend to overstate their exclusive rights over
the content they own.196
The question, then, is how best to allocate the cost of initial identification of
infringement between the rights holder and webhost. By recognizing fair use as
equally important as traditional copyright protections, the current legal framework
under the DMCA would realize several efficiencies. Under the current framework,
rights holders can send irresponsible takedown notices with no regard for fair use at
minimal cost, and with no realistic expectation of reprisal. 197 Instead, the framework
must reduce the cost of raising a fair use defense to a takedown notice. 198 Moreover,
rights holders should be held meaningfully accountable for overexerting their
copyrights.199 This would force rights holders to better pick and choose their battles
against potentially infringing content.200
YouTube’s internal appeals process
achieves this to an extent. At first, uploaders’ appeals to a YouTube takedown were
adjudicated by the rights holder requesting the takedown. Now, YouTube serves a
mediation role between uploaders and rights holders. If an uploader challenges a
takedown of one of their videos, YouTube now requires rights holders to file a formal
DMCA takedown. In this vein, rights holders now have to decide whether it is worth
their time and effort to file a formal takedown.
This current framework solves only half the problem, however. Although endusers are now more protected by once-removing the takedown abilities of rights
holders, they still face an uphill battle in challenging a formal DMCA takedown. 201
Ideally, there should be a balance between users’ ability to fairly use copyrighted
material and rights holders’ ability to enforce their copyrights. By recognizing fair
193 See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
Perhaps the most comprehensive observation of overreaching copyright claims in all mediums,
Mazzone provides an extensive review of the multiple ways rights holders overexert their copyright
protection.
194 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
195 Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1028 (2006).
196 Id.
197 Dena Chen et al., Updating 17 U.S.C. § 512’s Notice and Takedown Procedure for
Innovators, Creators, and Consumers, BERKELEY LAW 8 (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.public
knowledge.org/files/docs/cranoticetakedown.pdf.
198 Id. at 8–9.
199 Id. at 10–11.
200 Id. at 12.
201 Id. at 10.
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use as a right as opposed to an affirmative defense, rights holders could ostensibly be
liable for filing a DMCA takedown of uploaded content that is later found to be fairly
used.202 This would better streamline deeper-pocket rights holders into picking and
choosing their enforcement battles.
C. Human (Copy)Rights: Bolstering Morality and Legitimacy Through a Common
Understanding
Perhaps the most important goal in creating a more secure digital copyrights
framework is to “reestablish the social connection between citizens and legal
authorities that underlies feelings of trust in the motives of leaders.” 203 To achieve
this, there must be a meeting of the minds as to the importance of said rights in
society.
This must happen on a level beyond that of economic discourse. The economic
importance of intellectual property has never been overlooked. 204 Indeed, it often
serves as the underlying theme of intellectual property cases.205 Respect for these
laws will evolve through the realization that they benefit individuals and not just
industry behemoths like the RIAA and the Motion Picture Association of America
(“MPAA”).
This idea is becoming more of a reality as the Internet is becoming a basic
necessity. The United Nations has declared Internet access a human right. 206 There
is no doubt that as the Internet reaches the last nooks of technologically deprived
regions, the protections copyrights offer will be increasingly relevant.
Similar to how the Internet democratizes access to new and emerging ideas,
emergent online technologies democratize the ability to disseminate ideas. For the
first time in a major communication medium, this democratization is creating a
powerful stakeholder in the end-user as opposed to merely focusing on industry
oriented participants. For the first time in history, end-users have taken on a large
portion of the content generation responsibility. As such, the issue of copyrights can
best be internalized if it is placed in a context that is beneficial to them.
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CONCLUSION
Under the current legal framework, there remains ineffective regulation of
copyrights in cyberspace. Issues of enforcement aside, questions of the speed of
technological evolution raise concerns as to whether the legislative process can keep
up with emerging technologies. Anonymity coupled with various vehicles of content
delivery hurt rights holders’ ability to enforce their copyrights. Through anonymity,
people are more likely to break the law due to a lack of effective enforcement as well
as lack of effective legal targeting. In the context of copyrights in cyberspace, this
has led to “cyberanarchy.”
Recent legal developments—both statutory and common—have been unable to
reverse, or even slow, this descent into “cyberanarchy.” The problem can best be
solved through foundational changes in societal standards. By focusing on a bottomup framework that contemplates intellectual property rights as human rights, the
state would not only stress the importance these rights have on the individual (as
opposed to, say, media conglomerates), it would unify a collective thought that
legitimizes and bolsters personal moral views on this subject. This development, in
turn, would promote the perception that the State is a legitimate entity caring about
individual rights.

